Thomas Graham | 23 October 2024

Summary

• Israeli forces have initiated ground operations within Lebanon against Hezbollah militants to secure their shared border. 

• The wider Israeli combat strategy in Gaza and Lebanon is reminiscent of medieval siege warfare, in which superior firepower is employed to erode a contained and entrenched defender. 

• The progressively likely conflict between Israel and Iran will be conducted through indirect fire exchanges, tempered by the United State’s (US) pressure to prevent an all-out war.

The anticipated ground invasion of Lebanon by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), which began on 1 October 2024, has initially sought to displace Hezbollah from the border regions with Israel. While it remains highly likely that the IDF will press its advantage and advance further, the Israeli high command will exercise caution to avoid a conflict of attrition, as experienced in the 2006 Lebanon War. This episode saw Hezbollah employ guerrilla tactics to great effect, making use of highly trained militias and advanced equipment provided by Iran to inflict sustained casualties on the Israeli ground forces. The experience of this war has led to a change in Israeli strategic behaviours, employing methods of siege warfare through the leveraging of superior firepower. 

In this perspective, the opponent’s territory can be conceptualised as a castle - heavily fortified and crowded with soldiers. A direct assault to this position would result in steep casualties for the attacker, faced by an entrenched defender with extensive knowledge of their land. Amidst them, civilians are at a high risk of cross-fire and being mistaken as combatants. In medieval fashion, the Israeli approach to counteract this strategy has centred on containing the enemy within their territory by securing borders, thereby eliminating the defender’s mobility, and making use of long-range airstrikes and artillery to inflict casualties and destroy high-value targets. Once the opponent is sufficiently weakened, small ground incursions can be launched to occupy positions within the territory, with minimal casualties to the invading force.

Israel effectively employed the ‘siege’ method of warfare against Hamas in Gaza, and so far appears to be put to practice also against Hezbollah in Lebanon. This approach essentially negates the advantages held by the Islamist militant groups, in attempting to lure the IDF forces into urban areas replete with underground tunnels utilised for ambushes. Furthermore, attempts by Hamas and Hezbollah to utilise their rocket artillery against Israel have been largely ineffective, due to the competence of the Iron Dome and David’s Sling missile defence systems. While the explosive communication devices incident, supposedly executed by Israeli secret services, had served to indirectly weaken Hezbollah only weeks earlier, at this point of the war it appears that the Iranian proxy’s fighting capabilities are becoming largely exhausted.

The looming war with Iran, suggested by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s promise of retaliation to the 1 October 2024 ballistic missile attack, is also likely to consist of an exchange of indirect fire, albeit this time against a superior military with the full capabilities of the state behind them. US’ efforts to prevent a destabilising all-out war in the region present a realistic possibility that targeting will be contained to military and resource infrastructure sites, even if the danger of - purposeful or accidental - escalation remains a persistent threat. Israel has long sought the opportunity to strike at Iran’s nuclear facilities in an attempt to prevent their development of a nuclear bomb, yet these have been ruled out by US President Biden as acceptable targets. Israeli success will depend on balancing the ability to debilitate Iran and maintain the wavering support of its Western allies, while Iran’s most likely strategy will centre on overpowering Israel’s missile defence systems with large-scale barrages of missiles and drones to strike key targets.   

Forecast

• Short-term

  • The bombardment of Lebanon will likely be followed by further Israeli incursions into the territory, aiming to dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure similarly to Hamas’ in Gaza. 

  • Israeli retaliation to the 1 October 2024 Iranian ballistic missile attack will very likely signal the official start of the Israeli-Iranian war, which will see large-scale missile exchanges on key military and infrastructure sites.

• Medium-term

  • US pressure to prevent an all-out war in the region contains a realistic possibility of deterring attacks by both sides on major population centres, and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and oil facilities.