Thomas Graham | 16 July 2024

Summary

• Turkish protestors have attacked communities of Syrian refugees in Kayseri, leading to hundreds of arrests.

• Syrian mobs have retaliated against the attacks to their compatriots in Turkey, by destroying Turkish trucks and attacking army outposts in occupied northwest Syria.

• Public tensions could harm a potential diplomatic rapprochement between Syria and Turkey, who have suffered from strained relations since the 2011 Syrian Civil War.

Turkish protestors have rampaged through areas populated by Syrian refugees in the city of Kayseri, sparking Syrian protestors to attack Turkish trucks and a military base in northwest Syria on the week of the 5th July 2024. Diplomatic relations between Turkey’s President Recep Erdogan and Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad have been strained since the 2011 Syrian Civil War, in which Turkey supported Islamic non-state groups opposing Assad and enacted an open-door immigration policy for Syrians fleeing the conflict. Although the tensions in Turkey erupted after a minor was allegedly abused by a Syrian refugee, they can be seen as a wider symptom of a deep-seated dissatisfaction with Erdogan’s policies, also reflected in his party’s defeat in the 2024 local elections. 

Since Erdogan’s presidential election victory in 2023, Turkey has been facing a cost of living crisis fuelled by high inflation rates, peaking at 75% in May and predicted at 43% by the end of 2024. Additionally, the 3.4 million Syrian refugees in the country, who immigrated following the Syrian Civil War and the 2023 Turkey-Syria earthquakes, have exacerbated inter-communal violence through the perception that Syrians pose a threat to Turkish political and economic interests. Many host communities in Turkish cities have felt that municipality resources have been overstretched, since the allocation of treasury resources from the central government does not account for the number of refugees present in these localities. 

The Presidents of Turkey and Syria have recently expressed a desire to normalise relations, with discussions surrounding the opening of commercial crossings with Syria and a public statement by Erdogan that “The people of Syria are our brothers”. This approach was met with further demonstrations in the Turkish-controlled city of Idlib in Syria, in which residents denounced and called for the resumption of hostilities against the Assad government. It is evident that while the leaders of these countries can see a future of cooperation, the rift caused by the Syrian Civil War will not be so easily mended in the public sentiment. 

These protests in Turkey and Syria hold the potential to harm a possible diplomatic rapprochement, especially given the danger of escalation. The flare up of inter-communal violence in Turkey could result in further retaliation by their Syrian counterparts, which have so far led to hundreds of arrests and some civilian casualties. A combination of factors ranging from the grievances of the Syrian Civil War, to harsh socio-economic living conditions, and the link between immigrants and a deterioration of local services in Turkey, concerningly position Syrian refugees as a scapegoat for protestor’s frustrations. This is added to a rising tide of nationalism which has led anti-refugee and anti-arab sentiment, also seen in the Turkish opposition party’s plans to send Syrians refugees home instead of integrating them. Dependent on the scope of violence and chaos, each nation’s leaders may prefer to postpone normalisation to the benefit of stability. This episode is a stark reminder to Middle Eastern leaders that their rule is in part subject to the will of their citizens, and unpopular policies will not be passively tolerated. 

Forecast

• Short-term

  • Further violence against Syrian refugees in Turkey is a likely scenario, as popular dissatisfaction with Erdogan’s government grows and the President’s party is less equipped to handle inter-communal strife after losing the local elections in 2024. 

• Medium-Term

  • Syrian-Turkish diplomatic normalisation will almost certainly be postponed beyond 2024, as neither Erdogan or Assad can risk another vector of destabilisation. Moreover, the Turkish opposition party’s likely victory in the 2028 presidential elections could see another attempt at diplomatic normalisation with Syria to return refugees to their places of origin. 

• Long-Term

  • The eventual diplomatic rapprochement between Turkey and Syria will likely see a Turkish military withdrawal from the Syrian province of Idlib, although it remains to be seen if the province will return to Assad’s control given the population’s grievances against his government.