Thomas Graham | 21 August 2024

Summary

• China has recently become heavily involved in Middle Eastern diplomacy, following the U.S.’ gradual withdrawal and weakened ability as the dominant regional power broker.

• While displaying ambition in the exercise of its soft power in either perspective, Chinese interests in the Middle East can be attributed to economic or geopolitical strategic motives.

• China is certain to increase its regional influence in the near future, although only time will tell how committed it is to replace the US as the major foreign power in the Middle East.

The Middle East currently indicates a shift towards an increasingly multipolar world, mainly due to a rapid expansion of Beijing’s diplomatic efforts in the region. From the mediation of the Saudi-Iranian normalisation deal in March 2023, to President Xi Jinping’s personal appearance at the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in June 2024, Beijing’s diplomatic power has consistently trailed its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) across the region. The most recent episode has seen the Chinese Foreign Minister facilitating a reconciliation deal between the Hamas and Fatah Palestinian governments in July 2024, which is expected to take effect once the war with Israel comes to an end. An analysis of the purpose of these geopolitical manoeuvres will vary depending on the perspective of a realpolitik diplomat or a liberal political economist.  

The realist account points to a rising ambitious global player simultaneously exercising its soft power in the Middle East and curtailing US influence in the region, by presenting itself to Arab countries as an alternative power broker to the Western hegemon. It is unsurprising that as the U.S. recedes its Middle Eastern operations in favour of securitising the Asia-Pacific region, the power vacuum must be filled in accordance with the laws of Realism. Although local powers – namely Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey – are capable of projecting influence in their own right, these nations will ultimately require staunch backing from at least one of the global powers to attain their status as undeniable regional players.

The economic viewpoint emphasises the obvious economic benefits China derives from peace in the Middle East. War and instability in the region stand as the main threats to the expansion of its BRI and the flow of extensive trading networks with the West. For example, indiscriminate Yemeni Houthi strikes on shipping lanes in the Red Sea are prejudicial to any nation whose cargo ships must traverse the Suez Canal, adding further risks to trade and lowering commercial confidence. These dangers to trade are further amplified by the prospect of new region-wide conflicts, especially with the possibility of direct involvement from Iran. Through this lens, the gradual US withdrawal as a guarantor for peace and stability in the Middle East may have prompted China to step in to protect and expand its trade interests in the region.

Forecast

• Short-term

  • Chinese economic and diplomatic involvement in the Middle East is almost certain to rapidly progress over the next two years, as emphasised by Beijing’s delegation in the 2024 China-Arab States Cooperation Forum summit.

• Medium-term

  • China’s expanding influence in the Middle East will present numerous economic and technological opportunities for local states. Bilateral discussions surrounding partnerships in space and green technology have already taken place with states such as the United Arab Emirates, while the suggestion of defence cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia are currently under assessment. 

• Long-term

  • An expansion of China’s economic and strategic interests in the Middle East suggests a realistic possibility of an accompanying military presence over the next five years. Albeit, it remains to be seen if this involvement will materialise through Chinese personnel and military equipment in the region, or military cooperation pacts with established Arab powers.